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In this paper, a novel approach to behavioural modelling is presented with reference to
biological infection spread in communities. Its potential application to various terrorist-
related scenarios is discussed in relation to attack point simulation and interdiction
simulation.
Povzetek:
1 Introduction and Background
The motivation of this project is to develop a com-
puter model which allows the modelling of human
response to a variety of human threat scenarios.
These may range across both natural threats
such as disease, fire and flood and unnatural
events including accident and deliberate acts such
as terrorist attacks.
The tool is being developed in response to a
number of requests from third parties, including
both govenment and commercial bodies, to ad-
dress a wide range of roles.
Forensic: can we gain an understanding of
events that have already taken place?
Speculative: can we develop a reasonable “what
if” model for potential threats?
Decision Support: can we dynamically model
and predict the course of an evolving threat?
Training: can we develop realistic models for the
training of response personnel?
Evaluative: can we test the validity of assump-
tions made in other modelling techniques?
Terrorist attacks can take many different forms
using a wide range of weapon types and this
poses some considerable problems in defining both
the risks that arise in modern urban environ-
ments as well as optimising interdiction and re-
sponse strategies. Critical infrastructure is dis-
persed and provides multiple vulnerabilities and
opportunities for attack. As attacks both in Lon-
don and, more recently, in Mumbai have shown,
modern terrorism should be thought of as requir-
ing a 3D spatial vulnerability approach to counter
terrorism[7]. While both game theory and queu-
ing theory have been used for assessing terror-
ism events we present an alternative approach to
this problem which overcomes their fundamental
problem, that of estimating the number that get
through to attack.
Microsimulation is a discrete simulation tech-
nique which allows for the modelling of the be-
haviour of single individuals in a complex system
[4][13]. It was originally devised for financial and
economic modelling [17][15], but is generally ap-
plicable to a wide range of scenarios.
In the current research project, we have cre-
ated a modular, scalable microsimulation pack-
age, called Simulacron, which allows for the rapid
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creation of microsimulations involving large num-
bers of people interacting with each other and
their environment.
The framework is designed to be scalable and
distributable, implementing all interactions in
terms of distinct locations and individuals. The
state of these locations and individuals is flexible
and can be arbitrarily extended. Model behaviour
is broken into individual modules which can be
combined as needed.
In addition to this simulation framework, we
have also developed a number of support tools in-
cluding a prototype non-linear visualisation pack-
age which allows for the creation of complex vi-
sualisations by non-programming personnel.
Models are specified using an XML dialect.
The creation of very large and complex models is
achieved through the use of a preprocessor which
allows the instantiation of generalised templates
into concrete data sets.
The initial study undertaken was the simulation
of an influenza epidemic [8] at the Royal Naval
School (RNS) in Greenwich, London in 1920. It
was of particular interest due to the relatively
complete information available regarding the out-
break, including the progress of the disease over
time and its infection mechanism [6] as well as the
behaviour of the population in its “normal” state
[14]. This scenario was also attractive in that it
occurred in an essentially closed community for
which we have detailed historical documentation
[2].
The model of the RNS outbreak involved the
creation of nine dormitories, nine reading rooms,
around 40 classrooms and roughly 15 other loca-
tions including the hospital. Student behaviours
were established in seasonal class groups involv-
ing a total of 951 students. In addition, the be-
haviours of 27 staff were also modelled. Each of
these individuals is assigned a unique set of infec-
tious parameters based on statistical distributions
shared between all the participants. When the
simulation starts, each person is sent to their ap-
propriate location based on their schedule. The
movements and interactions, including cross in-
fection, of the individuals is then modelled over
time by Simulacron.
Behaviours are a mixture of constrained (stu-
dents must follow their timetables, sleep in as-
signed dormitories, etc.) and unconstrained (stu-
dents move about freely at playtime). As stated
previously, the modular nature of the framework
allows us to use whatever behaviours are most ap-
propriate for the model at hand.
The underlying infection model used in the sim-
ulation is conceptually a combination of the “Sus-
ceptible, Infective, Recovered, Susceptible” [11]
and “Susceptible, Exposed, Infective, Recovered”
[5] models (commonly known as SIRS and SEIR
respectively). In addition to the standard states,
we added two mechanisms to the model. The first,
“hero” time, allows the simulation of the “I’m too
busy to get sick,” or “It’s just a little cold,” phe-
nomenon. The second, isolation, allows for indi-
viduals to be removed from the cross-infection do-
main once disease is detected. The isolation me-
chanic can be conditionally applied only during
particular hours of the day. The parameters are
effectively selected by a convergence methodology
against the historical data. While the full proce-
dure is still being developed, the results in the
case study presented agree reasonably well with
other influenza studies [9].
2 Methodology
The simulation environment currently consists of
a number of programs: Simulacron, the simulator,
and DSTP, the template preprocessor. Planned
future additions include Jazz, a visualisation en-
gine and Refinery, an automated parameter esti-
mation system.
The following sections examine these in more
detail.
2.1 Simulacron
Early on it was decided to divorce the develop-
ment of the simulation models themselves from
the surrounding support code. This led to the cre-
ation of a general-purpose microsimulation frame-
work called Simulacron. On to this scaffolding,
special-purpose simulation modules can be at-
tached to craft purpose-built simulation environ-
ments. The current module set is discussed later
in this document in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
The framework has been written using the D
Programming Language. This choice was made
because it provided a number of advantages over
more traditional choices such as C, C++ or Java.
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Since it compiles to native machine code, it
has the performance advantages of C and C++.
It also directly incorporates automatic memory
management similar to that of Java. Distinct
from the above, D’s advanced template support
has allowed for the creation of complex, repeti-
tive code to be automated within the language
including serialisation and XML parsing libraries.
We have also utilised a customised version of
Don Knuth’s literate programming environment
[12] modified to process D instead of C.
The framework was specifically designed to sup-
port very large simulations, leading to the adop-
tion of a master/slave architecture, in which the
processing of the simulation can be arbitrarily
divided among one or more worker (slave) pro-
cesses under the supervision of the master pro-
cess. Each of these processes may operate in
a loosely-coupled environment such as that pro-
vided by a cluster or network of machines. This
architecture allows for the development of mod-
els of far greater size and complexity than could
reasonably be supported by a monolithic, single-
process design.
To date, it has been possible to operate with a
single slave running on the local machine. This
has permitted models with tens of thousands of
individuals.
The only requirement that the framework im-
poses upon the model is that it must be ex-
pressible using a combination of distinct locations
(called Cells) and individuals (called Peeps1). All
interactions and behaviours of these are specified
by the simulation modules. Due to its modular
nature, the framework itself places no require-
ments for any particular state information for lo-
cations or individuals; their state may be arbitrar-
ily extended by each module, by attaching fields
to cells and peeps, to allow for composition of
model components into arbitrarily complex simu-
lations.
Time in Simulacron is managed via discrete
“ticks”, time intervals chosen to be small enough
to capture important details in the model but
large enough to render large simulations practi-
cal. The master is responsible for coordinating
the slave processes via issuing tick commands.
This mechanism was chosen in preference to the
1Note that these are unrelated to the popular American
marshmallow confection of the same name.
alternative, queueing theory, approach (with free-
running slaves) as this was markedly simpler to
implement given that there is a potentially un-
bounded number of future events for every indi-
vidual object in the simulation at any given time.
It is also worth noting that using queuing the-
ory would make it far more difficult to distribute
processing as any event has the potential to affect
the state of any object in the simulation. This
means that no computational node can proceed
other than the node which has the next event,
thus making distribution of the work pointless.
In addition, the framework allows for the defini-
tion of multiple states, each referred to by name.
Each cell and peep is in one specific state at any
given time, independent of the state of other ob-
jects in the simulation. Cells and peeps may have
their current state changed by modules at any
time.
Input to the simulation is via an XML dialect.
Although not our first choice, XML has proven to
be a good fit to our needs; the extensible nature
of the framework demanding the ability to rep-
resent structured data of arbitrary complexity, a
task well suited to XML. However, this has proven
to be prohibitive in terms of defining large data
sets, a problem which is in part resolved by the
template preprocessing program DSTP discussed
in section 2.5.
Output from the simulator can be encoded in
a number of formats. Initially, XML reports were
used due to the availability of third party tools
which could read and process these reports in-
cluding web browsers such as Internet Explorer
and Firefox, which acted as rudimentary viewers,
and Excel, which allowed for more involved anal-
ysis.
However, these reports had an undesirable over-
head both in terms of disk space and processing
time. This has been resolved by moving to a more
compact and more easily processed database for-
mat based on the SQLite engine.
2.2 Movement Modules
In itself, Simulacron does not prescribe any be-
haviours for either locations of individuals. One
basic requirement for modelling people is move-
ment. To this end, there are two modules which
provide for different aspects of simulated motion.
The first of these is the scheduling module.
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This allows for each peep to have one cyclic sched-
ule defined per state for them. These schedules
are sequences of time and action pairs. When the
trigger time is reached, the defined action is per-
formed. Actions can include moving the peep to
another cell and changing their state (both deter-
ministically and at random).
For example, one could use a cyclic schedule to
define a full week’s worth of movement; going to
work on weekdays and engaging in leisure activi-
ties on the weekends. Alternately, the same could
be done by defining a one-day “workday” sched-
ule, a number of one-day “weekend” schedules and
selecting between them via the state mechanism.
There is also a similar scheduling mechanism
designed for “one-off” events. Whilst the cyclic
schedules define the time for events relative to the
start of the cycle, the “one-off” schedule defines
the time for events as an absolute date and time.
The second movement module is the dispersal
module which, in contrast to the scheduling mod-
ule, is applied to cells. Simply put, at each sim-
ulated tick, the cell will disperse each peep cur-
rently located within it to a cell randomly selected
from a defined set. The destination cell may, in
turn, also be associated with a dispersal set. This
is used to simulate, for example, children mov-
ing about in a playground or movement of people
within a large office building.
2.3 Infection Module
This, the first specialised module to be developed,
supports the modelling of a single infectious pro-
cess. In its simplest form it allows the injection
of one or more infected peeps into a population
of susceptibles. The infection can then be spread
between peeps within the same cell.
The infection model, as stated earlier, is a mod-
ified combination of traditional models. The in-
fection progresses through several states: sus-
ceptible, latent infected, asymptomatic infective,
“heroic” infective and symptomatic infective; fol-
lowing this, the peep will either recover (and pos-
sibly become immune) or die.
Each of these is present in various existing mod-
els (such as those in [11] and [5]), with the excep-
tion of “heroic” infective. This state was origi-
nally introduced to model people’s tendency to
shrug off or hide sickness. It is implemented as a
linearly increasing chance of “detection” starting
at 0% and ending at 100%, at which point the
peep becomes symptomatic infective.
This also plays into another feature of our
model: isolation. In its most basic form, this
causes symptomatic infective peeps to be forcibly
sent to an isolation cell until they either recover
or die. The heroic infective state interacts with
this to produce an increasing chance of a peep be-
ing noticed and sent to isolation as the infection
progresses.
Isolation can be configured to only be in effect
during particular times of the day. This was used
in our RNS simulation to limit isolation to day-
light hours; people are unlikely to be isolated at
night.
Cross infection is possible at every simulated
tick. For each susceptible peep in a cell, a ran-
dom number in [0, 1) is generated which is then
compared to the following:
P (Infection) × Time step
Average infectious time
×N
where P (Infection) is the peep’s chance of being
infected given continuous exposure over “Average
infectious time” (a parameter which is specified
globally), “Time step” is the amount of simulated
time that has passed since the last tick and N is
the number of infectious peeps in the cell.
An infection may also be spread via the envi-
ronment itself; cells can be “infected” at which
point they can transmit the infection to peeps
passing through them in the same manner. This
could be used, as an example, to represent an air
conditioning system for modelling the spread of
Legionella.
It is worth noting that not only is the progres-
sion of the infection recorded via a field attached
to each peep, but the various parameters that con-
trol the infection are as well. This means that
every peep in the simulation can have unique in-
fection parameters, which includes the duration of
the various stages of the infection, their chance to
contract the infection and their chance to recover.
A recent addition was the implementation of
“infection masking,” a process whereby each peep
can be placed into zero or more groups, with mem-
bership managed via a bitmap mask. The groups
a peep is capable of infecting can then be re-
stricted to a possibly different set of groups. This
allows for the representation of complex multi-
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vector diseases such as avian influenza.
It is interesting to note that there is nothing in
either this module or Simulacron itself that limits
the module to modelling the spread of an infec-
tious disease among humans. Peeps can be used
to represent anything which is capable of spread-
ing or merely contracting an infection: pets, wild
animals, birds and even particulate matter or
molecules of an airborne pathogen. Similarly, the
module can be used to model any process which
shares similar viral propagation. This includes
things such as memes or even a terrorist recruiter
(i.e. infective) subverting dissatisfied (i.e. suscep-
tible) individuals.
2.4 Terrorism Module
A recent development, the “TPC” module was
created to model simple terrorist scenarios. It al-
lows one to divide all peeps into one of three cat-
egories: terrorists, police and civilians; hence the
name. Terrorists are modelled as having three im-
portant parameters; the first is the “camouflage
factor,” which represents how adept that individ-
ual is at hiding themselves. The higher the factor,
the lower their chance of being “detected.”
Secondly, terrorists have an attack time;
presently, the model only deals with terrorists en-
gaging in suicide attacks. At the appointed time,
the terrorist will explode, killing all peeps within
the same cell. Finally, terrorists also have a con-
figurable chance of prematurely detonating them-
selves if they are detected by police.
Police have only one parameter: their percep-
tion factor, which represents their capacity for
spotting terrorists2. Thus, a terrorist’s chance
of being detected by any given police officer is
Fp(1 − Fc) where Fp is the police officer’s per-
ception factor and Fc is the terrorists’ camouflage
factor.3
Citizens have no parameters; their only func-
tion in the model at present is to serve as cannon-
fodder. This is not as needlessly malicious as it
may first appear: given a community derived from
real-world census data, they can serve to deter-
mine when and where an attack is likely to occur.
They also provide meaningful data in the event of
a premature detonation.
2There is currently no provision for “false positives.”
3This is normalised to be the probability of detection
over a one-minute time span.
Note that this model does not cover the motions
of any of the peeps involved; this is provided by
the movement modules.
The precise nature of the terrorist threat may
be adjusted to meet the needs of a specific sce-
nario. These may include the following:
Instantaneous lethality: e.g. the detonation
of a bomb with a substantial payload.
Delayed lethality: e.g. the release of some
chemical or radiological agent which is not
instantaneously lethal.
Probabilistic lethality: e.g. the detonation of
a low yield or less reliable explosive device.
Infection: e.g. the release of an infectious agent
or the terrorist deliberately infecting himself.
2.5 DSTP
Models are specified using a template language,
based on XML, which permits the creation of very
large data sets via the instantiation of relatively
simple macro templates. For example, this al-
lows the specification of a single template for a
statistically average individual which can then be
instantiated an arbitrary number of times to cre-
ate a background population into which unique
individuals may be “injected” to simulate specific
behaviours.
Note that although specifically designed to aid
in the creation of Simulacron data sets, DSTP it-
self is not limited to generating them. It could
conceivably be used to output any XML-based
format. DSTP also supports self-recursive be-
haviour where the output of a template may be
another template; an integer suffix can be added
to filenames which the processor will then decre-
ment when naming the output file.
Like the data set format, the template language
is based on XML. It resembles a relatively simple
functional programming language with dynamic
scope. Its standard constructs are concerned with
the definition and substitution/instantiation of
variables and templates. It also contains a few
primitives for the random sampling of values from
normal and uniform distributions; these can be
used anywhere a value is expected, allowing an
arbitrary mixing of randomly sampled and fixed
values.
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The language currently lacks constructs such
as conditionals, arbitrary looping and arithmetic.
Given the complexity of templates already pos-
sible with the language, we view this lack as a
blessing.4
Another key construct is the ability to instan-
tiate a template multiple times with a single in-
struction. Templates can be expanded a speci-
fied number of times, for each value in an integral
range or for each value in a list of words. It is
using this, in concert with the random sampling
constructs, that allows for a statistically “generic”
person to be defined and then instantiated into a
concrete population.5
To aid in the construction of more complex data
sets, DSTP supports a module system that allows
additional constructs to be added without requir-
ing change to the basic processor. These range
from very simple automation (such as generating
interlinked webs of dispersion cells) to much more
complex processes.
One such complex process is the creation of
communities: given a set of parameters (such as
number of adults, number of children, number of
employed, number of houses, etc.) derived from
census data, it will attempt to create a community
that matches those requirements. This includes
automatic creation of families and homes.
Another example is the “office builder” which,
given some basic properties such as number of
floors and offices, will generate a complete, in-
terlinked office building complete with lifts and
street access.
In addition to plug-in modules, common com-
ponents or even complete templates can be ab-
stracted into libraries via the import mechanism
to aid in reuse.
3 Preliminary Results
3.1 Infection
The original 1920 outbreak lasted for roughly 25
days. Each simulation was run over 30 virtual
days with a time step of five minutes and output
every hour. The output represents a snapshot of
the entire population, recording the location and
4The authors take the position that if the template lan-
guage ever becomes Turing-complete, it would likely be
advisable to simply switch to using LISP instead.
5The same can be said of generic locations.
infection state for each individual. For infected
individuals it also records the source of the infec-
tion, and when they became infected. This data
allows comparison with the historical number of
new cases every day.
Systematic changes to the model parameters
in successive simulations allowed investigation of
the sensitivity of parameters against the histori-
cal data. Furthermore, by varying only the ini-
tial random seed, different instances of the same
underlying process can be modelled, allowing the
determination of statistical parameters, such as
mean and standard deviation for such properties
as number of deaths.
The infection model is not a standard com-
partmental SEIRS type model and is more read-
ily suited to backcasting and forecasting methods
required for decision support in live situations.
Furthermore, because it simulates actions of the
individual it can test alternative policies and so-
cial controls that are difficult, if not impossible,
to test without making some gross assumptions.
Because of these attributes, it can be used to test
assumptions, made in other techniques, that are
not ordinarily testable.
Our technique also allows the investigation
of additional properties of the infection process
which would be equally difficult to evaluate with
traditional statistical modelling. Chief among
these is the ability provided to determine “infec-
tion chains”, a chronological sequence of who in-
fected who, where and when, essential in tracing
the exact progression of a disease and identifying
critical peeps and cells.
The results, even allowing for the relative sim-
plicity of the model and the inevitable inexacti-
tude of the parameter estimates, showed remark-
ably close agreement with the historical data, as
seen in Figure 1 below, capturing the develop-
ment, peak and recovery times with surprising ac-
curacy. Contrast this with the result of the more
traditional purely statistical model shown in Fig-
ure 2.6
An unexpected outcome was the presence,
among the simulation series, of runs in which, de-
spite all parameters being the same, no epidemic
6It could be argued that the statistical model is, in a
sense, more accurate than the simulation results as it pro-
vides a precise match for the total number of cases. How-
ever, the simulation method clearly provides a much more
realistic, if less “exact”, result.
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occurred. This suggests that further investigation
may be required into the “known” causes of epi-
demic spread.
3.2 Terrorism
The studies we are currently conducting are more
directly of interest to the present audience as they
include models related to terrorist activity. Two
of these we briefly describe below.
In support of this, a more comprehensive model
has been developed involving 14402 individuals,
grouped into families, whose overall properties
match the statistical census data for Australia,
interacting in an environment of 6935 locations in-
cluding 6000 homes and 935 workplaces, schools,
recreational areas, hospitals, etc. The people
move within the community according to sched-
ules that emulate employed, part-time employed,
unemployed and home workers, primary and sec-
ondary school children and infants that again
match statistical data for Australian communi-
ties.
3.2.1 Attack Point Simulation—the
“living bomb”
The first proposed model addresses the question
“What happens if we vary the point of release
chosen by a terrorist conducting a biological at-
tack?”
The required model behaviour for this scenario
can be achieved, without change to the previously
described infection model, by the injection of a
“living bomb” represented as a single individual
who remains stationary for the duration of the
simulation and becomes highly infectious at a pre-
determined moment in time.
Four locations in a virtual community were
used as a preliminary assessment of the impact
of location on release from a “living bomb”. The
four locations were a cinema complex, a club, a
large store, and the community hospital.
The infection that was used in the simulation
was based on smallpox with typical time parame-
ters given by CDC information [3]. The probabil-
ity of infection for each individual was the repro-
duction rate for an infected person adjusted for
the timestep used in the simulation. The initial
release emulated a badly constructed device with
limited ability to spread infection.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of peo-
ple who visited the four locations. Only two of
the simulations resulted in infection spread, the
club and the cinema complex with one infection
each over the release time. The infection occurred
about 10 hours after the release. The pathogen
in the absence of the human host was assumed to
be viable for approximately 24 hours. The time
of first infection is shown in Figure 3. It suggests
that in any release there is a threshold of exposure
required to spread infection; this can be the num-
ber of people or the time exposed. The store and
the hospital did not have enough people moving
through the building to make it likely that some-
one contracted the disease.
In the two cases of disease spread, the disease
continued to spread through the community. The
first appearance of symptoms occurred 14 days af-
ter exposure in the cinema and 18 days from the
club. By 80 days, 2560 and 2016 people were in-
fected from the cinema and club exposures respec-
tively. With this particular disease, the relatively
long incubation period does allow time for inter-
vention, isolation and ring vaccination so long as
surveillance systems for the disease identify a case
quickly. The second infected person in each simu-
lation became symptomatic 26 and 31 days after
the primary exposure by which time there were 4
and 5 additional infecteds.
These early results suggest that the location of
release will be extremely important to the num-
ber of subsequent cases of infection that occur.
While more studies are required to elucidate the
sensitivity to population moving through a target
and dispersal effectiveness at the point of delivery,
the result does have implications for assessment of
risk, the provision of resources for dealing with an
outbreak and the effectiveness of possible control
mechanisms.
3.2.2 Interdiction Simulation
The second proposed model addresses the ques-
tion “How effective is a specific interdiction
regime?”
This basic model may be varied by changing
properties in a logical manner. For example, re-
placing the instantaneous lethality of the terrorist
attack with a probabilistic one (a smaller bomb)
or replacing it with a conventional infective state
simulating the release of a biological agent.
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Because of the flexibility of the program, po-
lice behaviours may range from completely ran-
dom to precisely specified, the latter allowing the
investigation and validation of predetermined in-
terdiction strategies such as those derived from
game-theoretic modelling [16].
The community used in the above “living
bomb” scenario was used with the club as a target
location for a terrorist attack. The terrorist was
embedded in the community undertaking normal
activities arriving at the point of explosion just
before the time the explosion is due. Police also
moving about the community are attempting to
stop the attack. In the nine scenarios tested the
three factors that are used in the simulation are
shown in Table 1. There was one terrorist and
ten police in each of these simulations. Figures 4
and 5 show the results of the simulation; the top
shows the interception factor as a function of the
date and time while the bottom graph shows the
location and the number of dead or injured as a
function of date and time. The only simulation
to get to the target time of 03 Jun 21:23 was run
8. Pre-emptive detonation only occurred in run 0.
The other 6 simulations resulted in successful ar-
rest. The decline of the interception factor (top)
follows the transition from early to later times in
interception eventually resulting in no interdic-
tion and the terrorist reaching the target at the
designated time.
These two examples show the potential power
in this type of modelling as it can allow the inves-
tigation not only of complex attacks but also the
requirements for resources, the levels of percep-
tion or intelligence assistance and the tactics that
are needed to optimise these resources if these
types of activities are to be prevented.
Our method differs significantly from other
methods for assessing interdiction strategies
[1][10] as it is time rather than event driven and
based on the detailed modelling of individual
behaviour within population groups rather than
more abstract constructs.
Because of this, we can “inject” deterministic
behaviour patterns for specific individuals into a
background population modelled with randomly
varying properties.
The advantage as we see it over existing tech-
niques is that it can produce in simulations both
the successes and failures together with full infor-
mation about the paths to success or failure.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
A number of improvements to the array of
available simulation modules are presently be-
ing planned. These include a transportation sys-
tem including both personal and public transport,
the addition of multiple simultaneous infections,
chokepoints and other rate-limiting devices and
a “baggage” system to assist in accurately mod-
elling airports.
A number of new applications of Simulacron are
currently in planning, including the simulation of
a large transportation facility and the develop-
ment of a more comprehensive end-to-end terror-
ism model including the training of agents, the
planning, preparation and conduct of attacks and
the subsequent response.
From its inception, the simulation system was
intended to be part of an integrated risk mod-
elling and assessment software environment. To
this end, it is intended to integrate the Simu-
lacron package with a more fully-realised version
of the visualisation environment, allowing a bi-
directional real-time flow of data between them.
This package is currently called “Jazz” and
is based on a non-linear editor allowing a non-
programmer to connect various processing com-
ponents together to produce a visualisation. This
visualisation can then be distributed to other par-
ties and either be used interactively or to “play”
back a simulation visually. At the moment, Jazz
exists as a prototype with development proper in-
tended to begin before the end of the year.
This will allow dynamic monitoring and modi-
fication of the simulation process via an intuitive
graphical interface. Key to this process is the
planned development of a scriptable supervisor
process which will moderate and coordinate this
data exchange.
With this framework, it should be possible to
integrate further state of the art simulation pack-
ages dealing with such matters as the effects of
fire, explosions, etc. This would be achieved by
the representation, within Simulacron, of exter-
nally simulated events via such mechanisms as a
“survivability index” for a set of locations and
the dynamic modification of behaviours to rep-
resent the response to death, injury and damage
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to locations. The addition of further Simulacron
modules would allow the modelling of emergency
response to such events.
One of the key aims of the development of this
package was that it be capable of running at bet-
ter than real-time. This will allow the coupling of
non-simulated events to permit the use of the sim-
ulation environment to predict reactions and po-
tentially to investigate alternate response strate-
gies in a live system.
Another use is as a forensic tool to analyse past
events and to investigate the likely result of alter-
native intervention strategies.
Work is currently being done on a prototype of
the “Refinery” program which will automate the
derivation of simulation parameters by iteratively
refining them such that the output more closely
matches historical or expected results.
Interest in this project has already been ex-
pressed by a number of groups within Australia,
each of which has seen a different potential use.
These range from examination of policy effective-
ness in public health, through training scenarios
(spot the terrorist) in law enforcement to its use
as a decision support environment by emergency
response organisations.
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Figure 1: Comparison of simulated runs with historical data
Figure 2: Comparison of SEIR model with historical data
Run 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Camouflage Factor 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99
Perception Factor 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Preemptive Factor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Interception Factor 0.16 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.001
Table 1: Interdiction Factors
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Figure 3: Terrorist smallpox simulation
Figure 4: Interception factor
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Figure 5: Event location (cell number) and number of dead or injured by interception time
